OpenSSL · OpenSSL · published 2026-09-29
CVE-2026-84784QUIC: Unbounded RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID Backlog
Routine No exploitation evidence; EPSS 0.6%.
CVE-2026-84784 is not known to be exploited in the wild. EPSS estimates a 0.6% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 51% of all CVEs. This OpenSSL vulnerability: CVSS 7.5 (v3.1), attacks can be automated. Fixed upstream in OpenSSL 4.0.3, 3.6.5, 3.5.9, 3.4.8 (+3 more); patched packages are out for Debian, Ubuntu and Red Hat Enterprise Linux. Routine: patch when convenient.
Jump to: Remediation Exploit intelAffected versionsDescription
Remediation#
Fixed upstream in OpenSSL 4.0.3, 3.6.5, 3.5.9, 3.4.8, 3.0.23, 1.1.1zj, 1.0.2zs.
Linux distribution packages
If you run the distro’s package rather than an upstream build, this is the version to look for.
| Distro | Release | Package | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | 13 trixie | openssl | Fixed in 3.5.7-1~deb13u3 |
| 12 bookworm | openssl | Not affected | |
| Ubuntu (+2 more packages) | 26.04 LTS | openssl | Fixed in 3.5.5-1ubuntu3.6 |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux (+17 more packages) | RHEL 10 | openssl | Fixed in 3.5.9-1.el10_3 RHSA-2026:98588 |
| RHEL 9 | openssl | Fixed in 3.5.9-1.el9_9 RHSA-2026:98484 | |
| RHEL 8 | openssl | Not affected | |
| RHEL 7 | openssl | Not affected | |
| RHEL 6 | openssl | Not affected |
From the Debian Security Tracker, Ubuntu security notices (CC BY-SA 4.0) and Red Hat Security Data (CC BY 4.0). Check the distro link before acting.
Patch events
Crypto libraryOpenSSL
OpenSSL security fixes: 14 CVEs
Upgrade to
4.0.33.6.53.5.93.4.83.0.231.1.1zj1.0.2zsWhy: Vendor security release for server software (most severe: CVE-2026-84782).
Exploit intelligence#
| Signal | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Known exploited | No | CISA KEV |
| Ransomware use | — | CISA KEV |
| EPSS (30-day exploitation probability) | 0.6% (51th pct) | FIRST EPSS v2026.06.15 |
| CVSS base score | 7.5 (v3.1)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | CNA / CISA ADP |
| SSVC exploitation | none | CISA Vulnrichment |
| SSVC automatable | Yes | CISA Vulnrichment |
| SSVC technical impact | partial | CISA Vulnrichment |
Affected versions (from the CVE record)#
- OpenSSL OpenSSL
4.0.0to before4.0.3(affected)3.6.0to before3.6.5(affected)3.5.0to before3.5.9(affected)3.4.0to before3.4.8(affected)
Description (from the CVE record)#
Issue summary: A malicious remote peer may flood the local QUIC stack with NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames by avoiding a limit check on how many connection IDs the remote QUIC stack can use. Impact summary: The local QUIC stack sends a RETIRE_CONN_ID frame for every NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame it receives. The RETIRE_CONN_ID frame is dispatched via the Control Frame Queue (CFQ). If the remote peer also withholds ACKs, then it can force the local stack to allocate ~400MB (depending on ACK delay). CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Description: RFC 9000 sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 [1] describe the mechanism by which a remote peer can notify the local QUIC stack to change the destination connection ID (a.k.a. CID) the local stack uses to identify the connection at the remote peer. Each CID is associated with a sequence number. The sequence number is transmitted in NEW_CONNECTION_ID and RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames to identify the CID which is being either associated with a connection or retired. The remote peer sends a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame to let the local stack know a new CID is being associated with an existing connection. The NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame carries the new CID, its sequence number, and the retire-prior-to number. The retire-prior-to identifies existing CIDs that are to be retired. The local QUIC stack must send a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID for every destination CID whose sequence number is less than retire-prior-to. The CID becomes retired after the local stack receives an ACK for its RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. Although the OpenSSL QUIC stack supports at most one destination CID for every connection, it can be tricked into processing more than one RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame per connection. The OpenSSL QUIC stack currently retires the destination CID as soon as it receives the NEW_CONNECTION_ID, while in fact the destination CID must be retired after an ACK for the RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame is received. Correcting the flawed logic also fixes the backlog growth. [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-issuing-connection-ids FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Quoted from the CVE Program record.