Erlang · Erlang/OTP · published 2026-09-01
CVE-2026-71562httpc does not bound server-supplied numeric header values before integer conversion
Routine No exploitation evidence; EPSS 0.6%.
CVE-2026-71562 is not known to be exploited in the wild. EPSS estimates a 0.6% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 48% of all CVEs. This Erlang/OTP vulnerability: CVSS 6.3 (v4.0). Fixed upstream in Erlang/OTP 29.1.2, 29.0.6, 28.5.0.8, 28.5.0.6 (+2 more). Routine: patch when convenient.
Jump to: Remediation Exploit intelAffected versionsDescription
Remediation#
Fixed upstream in Erlang/OTP 29.1.2, 29.0.6, 28.5.0.8, 28.5.0.6, 27.3.4.19, 27.3.4.17.
Patch events
Language runtimeErlang/OTP
Erlang/OTP security fixes: 16 CVEs
Upgrade to
29.1.229.0.628.5.0.828.5.0.627.3.4.1927.3.4.17Why: CVE-2026-69664: Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC exploitation: poc).
Exploit intelligence#
| Signal | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Known exploited | No | CISA KEV |
| Ransomware use | — | CISA KEV |
| EPSS (30-day exploitation probability) | 0.6% (48th pct) | FIRST EPSS v2026.06.15 |
| CVSS base score | 6.3 (v4.0)CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | CNA / CISA ADP |
| SSVC exploitation | none | CISA Vulnrichment |
| SSVC automatable | No | CISA Vulnrichment |
| SSVC technical impact | partial | CISA Vulnrichment |
Affected versions (from the CVE record)#
- Erlang OTP
17.0to before*(affected)
- Erlang OTP
5.10to before*(affected)
- Erlang OTP
84adefa331c4159d432d22840663c38f155cd4c1to before*(affected)aba0fe8c2d700bf4ac94607cf7f00e53bbe4042dto before*(unaffected)e3be1cfe9f6cedd0cd20d9905e05601dfb31c8aato before*(unaffected)
Description (from the CVE record)#
Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpc allows a malicious or compromised HTTP server to degrade availability by returning a numeric header whose value is a very long run of digits. httpc_handler.erl converts the server-supplied Content-Length with list_to_integer/1 before comparing it against max_body_size, so the size check cannot protect the conversion, and the option defaults to nolimit in any case. The same unbounded conversion appears in httpc_response:format_response/1 for Content-Length and in httpc_response:get_ms_from_retry_after/1 for Retry-After, which is guarded only by a check that the first character is a digit. A value of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the requesting process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per response. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, and 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.
Quoted from the CVE Program record.